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Islamic Modernism: A Legitimate Part of
a Historical Tradition of Islamic Thought
Jan Kondrys
The topic of this paper is Islamic modernism, an important school of thought within
modern Islam, a source of inspiration for various current progressive movements and
individual intellectuals across the Muslim world. A brief introductory definition of Is-
lamic modernism with the description of its place in the context of traditional Islamic
thought is followed by an example of three noteworthy representatives of this tendency
to illustrate the typical feature of Islamic-Modernist argumentation: the return to the
essential sources of Islam, namely Qur’a¯n as the Word of God (Alla¯h) to enable the rein-
terpretation of certain deeply rooted norms of traditional approach to this religion and
its legal system. My point of departure is a thesis that Islamic modernism is a fully
authentic ideological direction within the framework of the broad historical tradition of
Islam and that those Western scholars, who used to claim that any and all modernist
tendencies in Islam were formed exclusively by Western liberalism, were wrong. This
paper is a part of broad research of Islamic modernism focusing especially on its Egyp-
tian branch.
[islamic modernism; modern islam; Egypt; reform; emancipation of women; islam and
politics; religious tolerance]
The topic of this paper is Islamic modernism, an important school
of thought within modern Islam, a source of inspiration for various
current progressive movements and individual intellectuals across the
Muslim world.1 A brief introductory definition of Islamic modernism
 Independent Researcher. E-mail: jan.kondrys@seznam.cz.
1 No agreement has been reached on precise dating of Islamic modernism, all dates are
mere approximations. The definitions include the shortest period of 1875–1925 and
a broader one of 1840–1940. From the second half of the 20th century Islamic mod-
ernism is followed up by heterogenic tendencies under various general titles (Lib-
eral Islam, Reform Islam, Progressive Islam, Neomodernism, etc.). The terminology
is rather vague partially also because of ideological variability of these tendencies.
Some authors even define Islamic modernism as a very broad range of reformist
branches within Islam since the first decades of 19th century up to the present.
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with the description of its place in the context of traditional Islamic
thought is followed by an example of three noteworthy representa-
tives of this tendency to illustrate the typical feature of Islamic-Moder-
nist argumentation: the return to the essential sources of Islam,
namely Qur’a¯n as the Word of God (Alla¯h) to enable the reinterpre-
tation of certain deeply rooted norms of traditional approach to this
religion and its legal system. My point of departure is a thesis that Is-
lamic modernism is a fully authentic ideological direction within the
framework of the broad historical tradition of Islam and that those
Western scholars, who used to claim that any and all modernist ten-
dencies in Islam were formed exclusively by Western liberalism, were
wrong. This paper is a part of broad research of Islamic modernism
focusing especially on its Egyptian branch.
Together with Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic modernism belongs
to the central branches of reformist tendencies in modern Islam. In the
course of 19th century almost all territories of the vast “Islamic world”
observed the effects of enormous scientific and social progress in Eu-
rope. Gradually this progress resulted in clear political dominance
of Europe over technologically lagging non-European regions to fi-
nally culminate as Western colonialism and imperialism. Proponents
of a rather heterogenic group identified by the Western Orientalists
somewhat simplistically as Islamic modernists were among the first
to warn the Muslim society of this unfavourable situation. Ideas of
Islamic modernism started to crop up to various extent and intensity
in almost the whole Muslim world, from sub-Saharan Africa and the
Balkans to south-east Asia. For obvious reasons modernist movement
was themost active in Egypt and India, the twomain centres of Islamic
thought in modern times. Led by their effort to avert decay of Muslim
societies they required a reform of contemporary (in their opinion de-
formed) Islam and general social practices so these would be more in
line with the spirit of modernity. Many facets of such religious and so-
cial reform were identical with values of Western liberalism (stressing
individual rights and freedoms, emancipation of women, religious tol-
erance, accountable governments, education reform and general sci-
entific and technical progress). Its founding fathers saw in this reform
a return to the values of “pure Islam” whose genuineness had suf-
fered over the long periods of Muslim history due to multiple “non-
Islamic” elements and irrational cultural customs that were harming
50
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
J. Kondrys, Islamic Modernism
the society. The modernists claimed to be the true Muslims but quite
often their conservative and traditionalist opponents blamed them for
atheism (ilha¯d) and for attempts of Westernization (taghrı¯b) of Islam
and of Muslim societies. It seems paradoxical that this view of Islamic
modernists has also been adopted bymany representatives of Western
colonialism, critics of Islam from amongst Christian missionaries and
even shared by quite a few Orientalists, almost to this day. After all,
to varying extent and on various intellectual levels of public debate
going on in many Western countries, Islam is still being labelled as a
religion incompatible in its nature with the requirements of modern
time.
Islamic modernism, as a broadly structured and intrinsically het-
erogenic branch, represents one of the reformist tendencies within Is-
lam, which have been resurfacing throughout history during various
times and within various contexts. All these tendencies strive to re-
turn to the “core” of Islamic religion incorporated in its sacred sources,
the “genuine” application of which would help resolve the issues of
a given historical period. The Islamic modernists of course did not
view themselves as agents of change and adaptation of Islam to the
requirements of modern time. They presented themselves as sincere
Muslims striving to revive the spirit of original Islam unblemished by
centuries of “non-Islamic” elements. For them, Islam was the right
ideological framework and guideline for the life of Muslims at any
time. Modernists perused classical Islamic terms like isla¯h (reform),
tajdı¯d (reconstruction), or ihya¯ (revival). These terms were used to re-
turn to Qur’a¯n and sunna (Islamic tradition), and reinterpret them.2
Islamic modernism could be also viewed as a more open and toler-
ant alternative of Islamic fundamentalism. Modernists shared some
of the points of departure with fundamentalists and both groups of-
ten used identical concepts, but they are arriving at starkly different
conclusions.3
2 S. HAJ, Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition. Reform, Rationality, and Modernity, Stanford
2009, pp. 7–8.
3 There are thosewho, due to their attitude, belong to both categories, yet, Muhammad
Rashı¯d Rida¯ (1865–1935), one of the most controversial figures in modern Islamic
thinking, is an example of such thinkers. Born in today’s Lebanon, then worked in
Cairo, he was the disciple (and biographer) of Muhammad cAbduh, initially fully
subscribing to the legacy of his modernist ideas. In later years he gravitated more
andmore to conservatism andArab nationalism, ardently defending the restauration
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Rather than clinging to the letter of the sacred texts and often rigid
legal norms modernists focused on ethical values contained therein.
Sacred sources of Islam inspired them to seek creative solution ofmod-
ern time issues. With the proceeding economic and political domi-
nance of the West over the Islamic world Muslims were facing
modern ideas, values and phenomena, like e. g. constitutionalism, na-
tionalism, civil society, religious freedom, modern science and ways
of education, emancipation of women, etc. Islamic modernists were
against both secular “adaptationism” of the “Westernized” Muslims
ready to “betray” their religious and cultural roots, and conservative
“rejectionalism” of traditionalists who automatically reject all modern
achievements and inspiration from non-Muslims. Islamic modernists
highlighted dynamism and flexibility typical for early Islam and went
through a process of internal self-criticism, striving to redefine tradi-
tional Islam so they could prove its applicability under transformed
conditions.4 They saw the tension between Islamic faith and moder-
nity as a consequence of historical development, not as the inherent
nature of Islam.5 Returning to sources of Islam, Qur’a¯n and partially
sunna and using the method of ijtiha¯d (rational reasoning),6 they
attempted to reinterpret some norms and regulations of traditional
Muslim society they saw as outdated and non-applicable. Some mod-
ernists were of course more or less influenced by the ideas of Euro-
pean Enlightenment, several of them had even lived in the West for a
period of time. However this influence that had been so often overem-
phasized in the past cannot be used to misinterpret their thought as
of the caliphate.
4 J. L. ESPOSITO, Islam, the Straight Path. Expanded Edition, New York – Oxford 1991,
p. 126.
5 Ch. KURZMAN (ed.),Modernist Islam, 1840–1940. A Sourcebook, New York 2002, p. 4.
6 Ijtiha¯d in Islamic jurisprudence is an independent opinion of an authorized scholar
when interpreting a certain religious (in the broadest sense of the word) issue, espe-
cially if there is no clear answer provided in the basic sources of Islam. In Sunn¯ Is-
lam since 10th century, there were four authorized orthodox schools of jurisprudence
and the prevailing opinion stated that “the gates of ijtiha¯d are closed” (despite the
fact that this was not consistently followed in practice). In Shı¯ca Islam on the other
hand ijtiha¯d has always been considered a legitimate tool for religious interpretation.
In the Sunnı¯ world ijtiha¯d enjoyed rehabilitation thanks to the 19th century reformism
headed by Muhammad cAbduh (1849–1905). The opposite of ijtiha¯d is taqlı¯d, blind
respect of and submission to old authorities, no attempts for independent solution
of a religious issue.
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non-Islamic. Drawing inspiration from foreign cultures and its trans-
formation to fit the religious framework had been typical for Islam
from its beginnings.
In further parts of this article I plan to introduce arguments typical
for Islamic modernism on an example of three of its Egyptian rep-
resentatives. I shall dwell on Qa¯sim Amı¯n reform ideas concerning
female emancipation, on cAlı¯ cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq contribution concerning
the relationship between islam and politics and on Mahmu¯d Shaltu¯t
modernistic exposure on the problems of religious tolerance and legit-
imate violence. Despite the fact that we are dealing here with diverse
themes presented by quite diverse personalities, I mean to emphasize
an inherent Islamic substance of their modernist approach, based on
– in a context of a historical tradition of Islamic thought – the fully le-
gitimate reform reinterpretation of Qur’a¯n as the central source of the
religion of Islam.
Qa¯sim Amı¯n: Emancipation of Women in Islam
Status of women in Islam is one of the “immortal” topics in polemics
between Western critics of this religion and its Muslim apologists.
There is a lively debate about it in the Muslim world as well, with
a gamut of competing concepts and opinions on desirable position
of women in society.7 Egypt is considered the birthplace of mod-
ern movement for emancipation of women in the Arabic as well as
Muslim world in general. Qa¯sim Amı¯n (1865–1908) is considered the
“founding father” of Egyptian feminist movement. This lawyer, who
had previously lived in France, aroused a scandal amongst Egyptian
intellectuals in 1899 when his book The Liberation of Woman (Tahrı¯r al-
mar’a), was published. Using an Islamic point of view he called for
reforms in female clothing, isolation of women, marriage, divorce and
education of women. These reforms were the necessary means to im-
prove the status of Egyptian women in society and in the family. His
book gained popularity among thriving Egyptian bourgeoisie and lib-
7 There is a wealth of sources in the literature on the status of women within Islam and
in Muslim society, cf. e. g. L. AHMED, Women and Gender in Islam. Historical Roots
of a Modern Debate, New Haven – London 1992; R. RODED (ed.), Women in Islam
and the Middle East. A Reader, London 2008; W. WALTHER, Women in Islam. From
Medieval to Modern Times, Princeton 1993; A.A. ENGINEER, Rights of Women in Islam,
3rd Edition, New Delhi 2008.
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eral intellectuals but also attracted the wrath of the ruling class, tra-
ditionalist religious scholars (culama¯’) and conservative nationalist ac-
tivists. The publishing of The Liberation of Woman was followed by
a number of books and papers filled with arguments against Amı¯n’s
propositions. Amı¯n responded a year later in his next book called The
New Woman (al-Mar’a al-jadı¯da) where he further elaborated his ideas.
In this book Amı¯n proposes a postulate about a direct link between
the general decline of Egyptian (Muslim, Eastern) society with the low
status of women. He argues that similarly as the quality of tradition is
in direct proportion to the quality of nation’s civilization, the same ap-
plies to the status of women. In advanced nations women have started
to overcome social barriers between themselves and men, whereas in
nations based on rigid family or tribal relations or in despotic regimes
the status of women remains low. Amı¯n acknowledged that Muslim
world lags behind the Western civilization but despite the assertions
of Christian missionaries and Western critics of Islam, he did not see
Christianity as a contributing aspect. He did not see any relation be-
tween Christianity and the level of progress achieved by contempo-
rary Western world, or the progress in the status of women, since
Christianity has not provided any norms or principles that would
have helped to achieve that progress. In an idealistic way Amı¯n de-
fines Islam as the first religion and a legal system that brought women
true freedom and liberation, introducing gender equality (except for
polygyny which was justifiable in those times), allowed women the
same rights in disposing of property and, unlike men, stripped them
of the care to provide for the family. In his opinion the current low sta-
tus of Muslim women was totally contradictory to the laws and prin-
ciples of Islam. In Amı¯n’s view the genuine cause of the backwardness
was a combination of superstition, traditions and folk customs which
the Muslims mistook for Islam.8
Amı¯n believes that failing to utilize the potential of 50 percent of
the population is affecting the society. While Western women were
already contributing their share to science, literature, art, commerce
or industry, the Egyptian woman in Amı¯n’s eyes was just a burden
for the society. Ignorant woman is seen as a victim of her emotions,
8 Q. AMI¯N, Tahrı¯r al-Mar’a, in: M. cIMA¯RA (ed.), Qa¯sim Amı¯n. Al-Acma¯l al-ka¯mila,
al-Qa¯hira 1989, pp. 322–328.
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unable to make any rational decisions in relations with other people
and often resorting to intrigues.9 The situation among the upper and
middle class bourgeoisie was the worst. Countrywomen in spite of
their ignorance were partners to their men at home and in the field,
but the city women lacking education were unable to cope with issues
of modern housekeeping. The worst according to Amı¯n was their in-
ability to properly raise their offspring. This generated a vicious circle
where men despised women and the women were not given the tools
to succeed in what was expected of them.10
Amı¯n regarded doubts whether education of girls is in line with Is-
lamic law (sharı¯ca), as unfounded or downright harmful. For children
and indeed thewhole nation to grow and prosper Amı¯n sees it a neces-
sity that women achieve at least basic education including reading and
writing and grasping the basics of arts and science, they should also
know about the latest findings in modern science and apply these in
household management.11 Outside home women can work as teach-
ers or nurses but they could also enter other professions according to
Amı¯n. Despite deeply rooted prejudice of many Egyptian men edu-
cation could help make Egyptian women more virtuous and enhance
their moral integrity. Amı¯n pointed to the chastity and virtuousness of
Western women in Egypt compared to the somewhat loose, lazy and
gossipy Egyptian women.12 Trusting that woman’s ignorance will en-
sure her chastity in Amı¯n’s view is the same like “a blind person is lead-
ing another blind person down a path and both fall into the first hole in the
ground”.13
Amı¯n was against Muslim women covering their face, this to him
is a non-Islamic custom taken over by the Muslims from other ancient
9 Ibidem, pp. 330–333.
10 Ibidem, pp. 334–340.
11 Ibidem, pp. 329–330.
12 It is quite rare among Muslim thinkers to come across such appreciation of morals
and integrity of Western women like in the work of Amı¯n. Even Rı¯fa¯ca Ra¯fic
at-Tahta¯wı¯, a prominent Egyptian reformist and admirer of Western civilization,
dispraised alleged frivolity of Western (specifically French) women, cf. R. R. AL-
TAHTAWI, An Imam in Paris. Account of a Stay in France by an Egyptian Cleric, 1826–
1831 (Takhlı¯s al-Ibrı¯z fı¯ Talkhı¯s Ba¯rı¯z aw al-Dı¯wa¯n al-Nafı¯s bi-I¯wa¯n Ba¯rı¯s), introduced
and translated by D. L. NEWMAN, London 2011, pp. 180–182.
13 AMI¯N, p. 349.
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cultures.14 By quoting the Qur’a¯n verse 24:31, hadı¯th (the Prophetic
tradition), where Muhammad speaks on the issue of female clothing
as well as opinions of Muslim religious authorities he is bringing ev-
idence that covering the face exceeds the sharı¯ca rules. It also brings
problems in everyday life both for the woman and for the whole so-
ciety, on top God in Qur’a¯n states clearly that religion should not be
an unnecessary burden for people (Qur’a¯n, 22:78). A covered face is
no guarantee of morals, since honesty of a person depends on moral
integrity. Whenever a man or a woman find themselves in tempta-
tion they should according to Qur’a¯n (Qur’a¯n, 24:31) avert their eyes.
Amı¯n concludes that there is no more reason for the woman to cover
her face than for the man.15
Amı¯n also condemns segregation of women and their isolation in
their homes.16 He refused to endorse the opinion that after reaching a
certain age women can be further educated in their homes separated
from the outside world. Such isolation affects mental and physical
health of women who are not exposed to sun and wind. Amı¯n sup-
ports his argument that freedom helps enhance morality by pointing
to Western (especially American) as well as Egyptian Bedouin and
countrywomen who in his opinion have higher moral standards than
isolated city women. Morality, Amı¯n says, is a question of choice, not
coercion and the possibility of committing adultery in no way justifies
the isolation of women. Amı¯n concludes: “An intelligent person will see
that whichever tools a man should apply to watch over his wife will not help
him unless he wins over her heart.”17
14 Prior to colonialism in Egypt Christian and Jewish women veiled their faces as well.
The reason given was religious but in fact it was more of a cultural norm. Paradox-
ically enough the West perceives the covering of females as a symbol of oppression
of women and a sign of barbarism, thus “Islamizing” this ancient custom. Thus, in
modern and contemporary Muslim movements protesting against Western cultural
domination the veil has almost become an instrument of differentiation of Islam from
the rest of the society or it is almost viewed as a symbol of resistance.
15 AMI¯N, pp. 350–359.
16 Idling away behind closed doors of home in isolation from the outside world was
the ideal of female lifestyle in 19th century Egypt. Some authors stereotyped this
ideal as a common practice, yet it was largely limited to so called haremwomen who
belonged to the highest classes. Those made up only about 2 % women in Egypt,
cf. S. ABDEL KADER, Egyptian Women in a Changing Society, 1999–1987, Boulder –
London 1987, p. 17.
17 AMI¯N, pp. 359–373.
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Amı¯n rejected the view of some Islamic scholars (culama¯’, sg. ca¯lim),
that marriage is “a contract that gives the man the right to sleep with
a woman” as a crude vulgarization of the noble concept of marriage
based on mutual love and support, found in Qur’a¯n (Qur’a¯n, 30:21).
Amı¯n sees as a precondition for love that the man and the woman
marry after a thorough reflection, when they got to know each other
and are sure about their mutual physical and spiritual attraction.
Amı¯n sharply criticized the habit of arranged marriages where the
woman had no right to protest the decision of her family.18 He also
criticized polygyny, especially from the moral point of view.19 Only a
monogamous man is able to fulfil the rights of his wife and his chil-
dren, provide for them, care for them and love them. Qur’a¯n does
legalize polygyny (Qur’a¯n, 4:3) but at the same time warns from it
(Qur’a¯n, 4:129). Unlike ancient times polygyny has no grounds in an
advanced society, here its negatives prevail and it brings about moral
disintegration of the family. Amı¯n would allow for a polygynous mar-
riage only in such exceptional cases like infertility of the first wife.20
Amı¯n disapproved of the high divorce rate in Egyptian society. The
Christian concept of absolute inadmissibility of divorce was however
strange to him as it ignores in his opinion the nature and needs of
people. The Islamic concept of divorce based on Muhammad’s state-
ment: “Out of all that is allowed God sees divorce as the most deplorable act”,
was the absolutely wisest in his opinion. He quoted Qur’a¯n verses on
divorce (Qur’a¯n, 2:228, 4:19, 4:34–35, 4:128, 65:1–2) and inferred that
breaking-up of marriage is not to be taken lightly since it is linkedwith
the essential issues family relations or inheritance. Amı¯n drafted a le-
gal regulation for divorce based on the sharı¯camodel that would make
it more formal and provide the judge with a more active role in his ef-
fort to avert it, to engage arbiters from the families of the husband and
wife and to ensure the presence of witnesses if the divorce judgment is
18 Ibidem, pp. 387–391.
19 Polygyny (mostly limited tomaximum twowives) was a relatively rare phenomenon
at the end of the 19th century Egypt, found almost exclusively in higher strata of so-
ciety, cf. M. BADRAN, Feminists, Islam, and Nation. Gender and the Making of Modern
Egypt, Princeton – New Jersey 1995, p. 6. In spite of its marginality (the usual statis-
tics say that about 1–2 % of all marriages inMuslimworld are polygynous) polygyny
represents one of the key points of contention between the critics of Islam and Mus-
lim apologists.
20 AMI¯N, pp. 393–397.
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to be final. Amı¯n did wish to reduce divorce rate in Egypt but he also
required that it must be made easier for the women to obtain divorce
because under current conditions it was almost impossible for them.21
In The New Woman Amı¯n confirmed his earlier standpoints but this
bookwas still rather different. Amı¯n swerved from his original Islamic
modernist arguments to secular arguments focusing on the idea of lib-
eration of women as a precondition for liberation of the entire society.
He compared the arguments of opponents of women’s liberation to
those of despotic oriental rulers against the freedom of speech in their
countries.22 The book contains a wealth of references to modern in-
tellectual and scientific findings. The Western society model is openly
plotted out as a model suitable for Egypt or even the whole Muslim
world.
Qa¯sim Amı¯n was aware of the need to provide a theoretical argu-
ment to refute a factual accusation that he is a traitor of Islam due to
his pro-Western opinions. In The Liberation of Woman he was stress-
ing Islamic legitimacy describing his requests as an effort to return to
the genuine spirit of sharı¯ca. In The New Woman he is openly declaring
that using inspirations from modern West even such that would not
be limited only to mere reception of technological achievements and
scientific discoveries is the only way for Egypt and the Muslim world
to attain progress. The success of Islamic civilization during ancient
caliphate times in Baghdad or Cordoba may be used as a source of in-
spiration. But they should not be viewed uncritically as a climax of all
human achievement. The fact that Islam is a truthful religion does not
imply that Islamic civilization must be the best that there ever was.
Amı¯n violated all conventions as soon as he challenged spiritual and
moral supremacy of the Eastern and especially Muslim societies over
the West.23 He labelled such claims, popular among Muslims, as prej-
udicial, biased and serving merely as a misguided attempt to over-
come one’s own inferiority complex face to face to the material lead of
the West.
While conservative nationalists like Mustafa¯ Ka¯mil or Talcat Harb
viewed the whole idea of emancipation of women as just another con-
21 Ibidem, pp. 397–410.
22 Q. AMI¯N, Al-Mar’a al-jadı¯da, in: M. cIMA¯RA (ed.), Qa¯sim Amı¯n. Al-Acma¯l al-ka¯mila,
al-Qa¯hira 1989, p. 486.
23 AMI¯N, Al-Mar’a al-jadı¯da, pp. 500–510.
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spiracy aiming at weakening of the Egyptian nation and at infiltrat-
ing Egyptian society with the filth and decadence prevailing in the
West,24 at the time of his case and during the following decades Amı¯n
was receiving a relatively broad acclaim by Egyptian liberal national-
ist and feminist intellectuals.25 After all, Egyptian feminists view him
to this day as their “founding father”. One such feminist organiza-
tion in Egypt adopted in 1986 al-Mar’a al-jadı¯da as their title to honour
Amı¯n’s legacy.26 In their vast majority Orientalists initially revered
Amı¯n and his work, recent decades saw a more critical approach to
his work and his overall contribution to the women’s liberation move-
ment in Egypt.27
It is not easy to provide an unequivocal assessment of Amı¯n as such.
He was undoubtedly very pro-Western on one hand and his argu-
ments bore the influence of the giants of modernWestern thinking like
Karl Marx (1818–1903), Charles Darwin (1809–1882), Herbert Spencer
(1820–1903) and others. Amı¯n also draws on Islamic modernism, his
inspiration by the foremost personages of this branch Jama¯luddı¯n al-
Afgha¯nı¯ and Muhammad cAbduh allows no space for doubts. In spite
of his pro-Western inclination he remained a staunch Egyptian nation-
alist and to label him as a collaborator with British colonialism was
downright unjust. Reforms he proposed were not especially radical
or original given the spirit of his time.28 In contrast to other Egyp-
tian Islamic modernists he was radical in preaching absolute theoret-
24 ABDEL KADER, pp. 62–64.
25 Ch.C. ADAMS, Islam andModernism in Egypt. A Study of the Modern ReformMovement
Inaugurated by Muhammad cAbduh, London 1933, pp. 231–234.
26 N. AL-ALI, Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East. The Egyptian Women’s
Movement, Cambridge 2004, p. 56.
27 Leila Ahmed (Layla¯ Ahmad) (American scholar of Egyptian background) delivered
perhaps the harshest criticism of all of Amı¯n’s work. She branded Amı¯n as a misog-
ynous “son of British colonialism”, whose true objective was to replace the Islamic
style male dominance in Egypt by the Western style male dominance, cf. AHMED,
pp. 144–168.
28 Cf. cIMA¯RA (ed.), pp. 124–131. It seems likely that Amı¯n borrowed and incor-
porated in his book many of cAbduh’s arguments and especially cAbduh’s inter-
pretation of Qur’a¯n in relation to veil, marriage, polygyny or divorce. This lessens
somewhat the importance of Amı¯n’s work from the religionist point of view. Yet
it is necessary to note that from the viewpoint of the tradition of (not only) Muslim
scholars in the past, such “plagiarism” or a lack of originality was not perceived neg-
atively but as a contribution to the spreading of the specific ideas. Amı¯n definitely
deserves the merit for making the public aware of these ideas.
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ical separation of Islam as a religious system (dı¯n) from Islamic civi-
lization (hada¯ra). He also deserves credit for how clearly he was able
to express the feelings of a certain portion of Egyptian middle class
which has started to establish itself at a time when due to transformed
social conditions very large family households started to be perceived
as a harmful anachronism and “the former homosocial harem was to be
replaced by heterosexual nuclear family”.29 Even if Qa¯sim Amı¯n is not to
be seen as the founder of Islamic feminism he was certainly somebody
who helped to kindle a stormy debate that goes on until now, in the
whole Egyptian society, on emancipation of women.
cAlı¯ cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq: The Separation of Islam and Politics
Based on his reinterpretation of Qur’a¯n and applying his revision-
ist take on historical events surrounding the formation of Islam the
renowned Islamic lawyer cAlı¯ cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq introduced a theoretical
divide between religion and politics. In his book Islam and the Funda-
mentals of Authority (al-Isla¯m wa usu¯l al-hukm) published in 1925 at the
time of exacerbated debates on the future of caliphate he renounced
the traditional views of Muslim scholars that Islam, among others,
sets out an ideal model of government. In Egypt the book caused
a scandal and resulted in persecution of cAlı¯ cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq and his
temporary withdrawal from public life. Defending secular ideas was
not the worst, in those times Egypt had already had its fill on those.
But for cAlı¯ cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq as a religious authority to pursue his teach-
ing using Islamic arguments and the classical Islamic language, that
was a genuine scandal. This “malicious attack against his own people”
unleashed the wrath of the orthodox religious establishment. Disci-
plinary proceedings at the al-Ahzar University resulted in his banish-
ment from the rows of Egyptian culama¯’.30
In his book cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq deals with the issues of caliphate chal-
lenging the prevailing view of medieval scholars that caliphate (al-
khila¯fa) is the religiously binding institution representing the Islamic
community (umma). He quotes the views of Muslim authorities that
it is the duty (wa¯jib) of umma to establish a caliphate and to disobey
29 HAJ, p. 155.
30 On al-Azhar trial with cAlı¯ cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq see L. BINDER, Islamic Liberalism. A Cri-
tique of the Development Ideologies, Chicago 1988, pp. 144–146.
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a caliph is equal to disobeying God.31 Ibn Chaldu¯n (1332–1406) and
many other scholars saw the main evidence of the binding nature
of caliphate in the consensus (ijma¯c) reached amongst Muhammad’s
followers upon Muhammad’s death, that Abu¯ Bakr shall become a
caliph, i. e. the head of the Muslim community who will prevent an
outbreak of chaos32 amongst the (religious) people. The main problem
for cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq is the lack of reliable evidence of the binding nature
of caliphate in Qur’a¯n or sunna: “If there was but one evidence in the whole
Book, culama¯’ would never hesitate tio quote it and glorify. . .”33 For him
a caliphate is an entirely mundane institution, the same as a kingdom
and he challenges the validity of ijma¯c about it. From a historical point
of view he sees it as an establishment based solely on power and op-
pression.34 Any and all references to political authority in Qur’a¯n or
sunna that might be viewed as supportive of a caliphate cannot be in
any way interpreted as a call for starting some form of successorship
of the Prophet Muhammad. This includes the well-known verse: “O
ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are
in authority!” (Qur’a¯n, 4:59),35 quoted by the advocates of caliphate,
which does not call, according to this interpretation, for establishing
some novel form of political authority.
This was a steppingstone to the essential question, whether Prophet
Muhammad was or was not the founder of a Muslim state in Medina
and whether he was its first ruler, as the majority of Muslims believe.
cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq points out that it is necessary to strictly differentiate
between the function of a prophet and a ruler. The fact is that the vast
majority of well-known prophets were not rulers. Jesus was one such
31 cA. cABD AR-RA¯ZIQ, Al-Isla¯m wa Usu¯l al-Hukm. Bahth fı¯ al-Khila¯fa wa al-Huku¯ma fı¯
al-Isla¯m, al-Qa¯hira 1925, pp. 2–4.
32 Chaos broke out in the Muslim community after Prophet Muhammad died, as to
the appointment of a new leader. The dispute that started to simmer was promptly
resolved by one of the most honorable members of the community cUmar Ibn al-
Chatta¯b, when he paid a traditional ancient Arabic tribute (bajca) to the respected
Abu¯ Bakr, friend and father in law of the Prophet, later on the majority of Muslims
followed his example and did the same. Cf., e. g., M. LINGS, Muhammad. His Life
Based on the Earliest Sources, Cambridge 1991, pp. 345–348; M.H. HAYKAL, The Life
of Muhammad, Kuala Lumpur 2008, pp. 541–550.
33 cABD AR-RA¯ZIQ, pp. 13–14.
34 Ibidem, pp. 21–38.
35 TheMeaning of the Glorious Quran byMuhammadMarmaduke Pickthall (Hyderabad-
Deccan 1938) is the source for all Qur’a¯n quotes in this paper.
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classical example of a prophet who explicitly preached about being a
subject of the Ceasar (Matthew 22:21). Did Muhammad happen to be
one of the few exceptions of those who were prophets and kings at the
same time?36
cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq admits that Muhammad as a Prophet had a some-
what unique position amongst his people but his authority was differ-
ent from that of the mundane rulers. Both Qur’a¯n and aha¯dı¯th (reports
about teachings and sayings of Muhammad) point to the superiority
of a prophet that needs to be recognized by his people, who should
obey and respect him. God said: “We sent no messenger save that he
should be obeyed by Allah’s leave.” (Qur’a¯n, 4:64) A prophet may play a
similar role as a monarch in defining the main policy orientation, but
his main task, not shared with anybody, is to “touch the souls and un-
veil the hearts”. It is clear that he is to regulate both every-day and
otherworldly matters of his flock.37
cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq has no doubts that Muhammad established a unique
religious community, became its head, preached unity and managed
to achieve it before he died as an unchallenged leader. But there are
many instances in Qur’a¯n that prove that Muhammad was not a cus-
todian of Muslims (Qur’a¯n, in verses 4:80, 6:66–67, 6:106–107, 10:99,
10:108, 17:54, 25:43, 39:41, 42:48, 50:45, 88:21–22), he was not a founder
of a specific form of government, his authority amongst his people
originated purely from him being God’s messenger on Earth.38 cAbd
ar-Ra¯ziq shows that there were various tribes living in various regions
of Arabia, people speaking various dialects, bound by various politi-
cal ties. All these became united through religion, the ethics of which
the Prophet preached, they became brothers in faith. There is nothing
that could lead us to believe that the Prophet would have intervened
into the administrative and judicial system of individual tribes. But he
did bring the Islamic order, rules and unity, all of which had a great
effect on most aspects of life of peoples who adopted Islam. “It might
perhaps be said that this code of ethics, customs and laws brought by the
Prophet, peace be upon him, for Arabic and non-Arabic communities alike
were vast and numerous and referred to many aspects of life of these commu-
nities. There were regulations on punishment, the military, jiha¯d, trade, lend-
36 cABD AR-RA¯ZIQ, pp. 48–50.
37 Ibidem, pp. 65–67.
38 Ibidem, pp. 67–72.
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ing money, pawning things, fine behaviour in sitting, walking and speaking
and many others. [. . . ] At a closer look however, it becomes apparent that all
that has been introduced by Islam and what the Prophet taught the Muslims
about social order, customs and ethical rules had nothing in common with
any kind of political rule and with governing a mundane state.”39 Islamic
faith, rituals or social rules are of a religious nature only and even if
Arabs were linked by Islam, there were still differences between their
political, social, economic and public life. According to cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq
those who see the times of the Prophet as the times of political unity
and harmony believe in myths.40
Thus Muhammad was a leader only through his role of God’s mes-
senger, a mere interpreter of God’s will. It was for him only to “con-
vey (the message) plainly” (24:54), he was a mere conveyer (muballigh,
verses 5:92, 5:99, 13:40, 16:35, 16:82, 36:17 aj.), the bearer of good tid-
ings (mubashshir, bashı¯r, verses 7:188, 17:105, 19:97, 25:56, 33:45–46,
34:28) and a warner (mundhir, nadhı¯r, verses 7:184, 7:188, 11:12, 13:7,
17:105, 19:97, 22:49, 27:91–92, 33:45–46, 34:28, 34:46, 38:65 etc.).41 None
of the political and military events that took place during Muham-
mad’s life had anything to do with religion according to cAbd ar-
Ra¯ziq. Muhammad’s appeal was an appeal to God based on peaceful
enlightening and on winning over the hearts of people. Power and co-
ercion had no place there (Qur’a¯n, verses 3:20, 10:99, 16:125, 88:21–22).
Did not God say clearly: “There is no compulsion in religion.” (Qur’a¯n,
2:256)42 Muhammadwas “the Seal of the prophets” and this is the rea-
son why nobody else will ever play the same role as he did.
After the death of the Prophet the power went to a purely secular
government but thanks to the extraordinary personal religious devo-
tion of Abu¯ Bakr the Muslims started to call him wrongly the succes-
sor of God’s messenger (chalı¯fat rasu¯l Alla¯h) and this title was wrongly
regarded as a religious function. Later on, after the introduction of
classical monarchies on Muslim territories the rulers misused faith to
protect themselves from potential rebellions and any revolt against the
state systemwas proclaimed a revolt against God. Bymaking the topic
of caliphate the central Islamic dogma they committed a crime against
39 Ibidem, pp. 83–84.
40 Ibidem, pp. 85–86.
41 Ibidem, pp. 73–75.
42 Ibidem, pp. 52–53.
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Muslims and “led them astray”. cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq believes that it is high
time for Muslims to realize that Islam is offering them full freedom to
choose the best possible form of government and public administra-
tion based on past experience and current situation and needs.43
The initial response to cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq’s book in Egypt was largely
negative. Those who defended him publicly were mostly using free-
dom of expression, guaranteed by the 1923 Constitution, as their main
argument. However, none of these people would subscribe to the
pivotal ideas in his book.44 Only a few liberal intellectuals like Ta¯ha¯
Husayn (1889–1973), Muhammad Husayn Haykal (1888–1956) or Ah-
mad Amı¯n (1886–1954) did, at least partially, endorse his stance.45
Muhammad Rashı¯d Rida¯ (1865–1935), the author of an influential
work The Caliphate or the Great Imamate (al-Khila¯fa aw al-ima¯ma
al-cuzma¯), contending that the Islamic state is the necessary precon-
dition for the functioning of Muslim umma, could have taken cAbd
ar-Ra¯ziq’s book as a personal affront and denounced it in the conser-
vative nationalist al-Liwa¯’ (Flag) newspaper.46 He asserted that this
is the latest attempt of the enemies of Islam to weaken and paralyze
Islam.47 Muhammad al-Khidr Husayn (1876–1958), the rector of al-
Azhar University in 1952–1954 labelled cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq as an alienated
43 Ibidem, pp. 95–103.
44 I. GERSHONI – J. P. JANKOWSKI, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs. The Search of Egyptian
Nationhood, 1900–1930, Oxford 1987, pp. 67–68.
45 S. T. ALI, A Religion, not a State. Ali cAbd al-Raziq’s Islamic Justification of Political Secu-
larism, Salt Lake City 2009, p. 104.
46 Rida¯ is sometimes regarded as the pioneer of the theory of modern Islamic state and
his attitudes have strongly influenced political ideology of the Muslim brotherhood,
be it in a modified form. He differentiated between the original ideal of caliphate and
the way it was operated under the “rightly guided caliphs” (al-khulafa¯’ ar-ra¯shidu¯n),
and the contemporary “decadent” nature of Ottoman caliphate in which however he
still saw the necessary institution protecting the umma from disintegration spurred
on by foreign powers. In Rida¯’s view an ideal form of a caliphate would represent
trends and branches of Islam with the caliph as the supreme interpreting authority
of the faith (mujtahid). He called for improved relations between Arabs and Turks
to revive the unity of umma. His attitude to the issue of caliphate reflects the differ-
ences between the concept of Islamic universalism and Arab nationalism as well as
between religious idealism and political realism. On Rida¯’s concept of the Islamic
state see H. ENAYAT, Modern Islamic Political Thought. The Response of the Shı¯c ı¯ and
Sunnı¯ Muslims to the Twentieth Century, London 2005, pp. 69–83; A. HOURANI, Ara-
bic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939, Cambridge 1983, pp. 239–244, etc.
47 HOURANI, p. 189.
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person fascinated by the West and its theoreticians, philosophers and
Orientalists. His view of caliphate as a tyranny had been allegedly
shaped by the negative perception in Europe of the Roman Catholic
Church.48
It took many years for a more sober critical view of cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq’s
work to appear in Egypt, e. g. in the book byMuhammad cIma¯ra Battle
of Islam and the Fundamentals of Authority (Macrakat al-Isla¯m wa usu¯l al-
hukm, 1989). cIma¯ra appreciated cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq’s contribution to Egyp-
tian intellectual discourse but criticized alleged inconsistencies in the
book in the way the people respected the Prophet’s authority and the
nature of Abu¯ Bakr’s leadership. The sharpest criticism aims at cAbd
ar-Ra¯ziq’s negative attitude to caliphate portrayed using only the dark
aspects of its history, ignoring at the same time the host of noble pos-
tulates of the Islamic political theory. Absolutism described by cAbd
ar-Ra¯ziq is remote from the original nature of Islam, it found its way
there only through the Shı¯ca theory of imamate based on Persian feu-
dalism or through the Umayyad dynasty (661–750) that adopted the
Byzantine way of ruling in Damascus.49
It is not easy to assess cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq’s contribution to modern Is-
lamic thinking objectively. Even though he was rejected in his time,
some of his ideas still keep resurfacing after dozens of years in unre-
solved disputes between the followers of “secular” or “Islamic” polit-
ical trends in the Muslim world. To this day cAlı¯ cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq clearly
remains outside the majority frame ofMuslim thinking due to the way
he challenged Islam’s links with any political issues.50 Claims about
“Western” and “non-Islamic” origin of his ideas that allegedly aim at
damaging Islam can be clearly rejected as biased and misconstrued.
cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq’s “Islamic secularism” represents one of the extreme
forms of Islamic modernism that seeks within the Muslim world au-
thentic answers to the contemporary challenges.
48 ALI, pp. 105–107.
49 M. cIMA¯RA,Macrakat al-Isla¯m wa usu¯l al-hukm, al-Qa¯hira 1989, pp. 52–60.
50 cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq had only a few programmatic followers in Egypt, those were liberal
intellectuals like the renowned lawyerMuhammad Sac ı¯d al-Ashma¯wı¯ (1932–2013) or
the younger brother of the founder of Muslim brotherhood Jama¯l al-Banna¯’ (1920–
2013).
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Mahmu¯d Shaltu¯t: Islam as a Religion of Peace and Tolerance
One cannot say that the Western world associates the religion of Is-
lam with peace and tolerance. Some of Islam’s detractors allege that
the source of its intolerant and militant expressions is inherent in its
very principle and sacred writings. The attitude of the Islamic law to-
ward non-Muslims became systematized soon after the birth of Islam,
at the time of the extraordinary Muslim military expansion. In the for-
mative stages of Islamic history, converting non-Muslims was not the
armed jiha¯d’s primary objective.51 Rather, its purposewas the political
unification of the territories conquered and governed by Islam.52 The
Islamic order tolerated religious diversity, and non-Muslims living in
territories under Muslim rule enjoyed the status of protected persons
(ahl adh-dhimma). As such, they were granted the protection of life and
property, religious freedom, and substantial legal sovereignty in the
internal affairs of their communities, provided they deferred to the po-
litical authority of the Islamic state, paid a special per capita tax (jizya),
and accepted a degree of legal discrimination. Initially, the protected
person status pertained only to Jews and Christians (ahl al-kita¯b – Peo-
ple of the Book), i. e., members of the monotheistic religions. Later on,
as Islam took over new territories, other non-Muslims (Zoroastrians
in Iran, Hindus in India, etc.) gained the same protection.53 Although
the level of tolerance for members of other denominations in Muslim
lands fluctuated with geographical position and the passage of time,
51 Jiha¯d (striving in Arabic) is a classic term of Islamic legal science, often misunder-
stood by the Western public as well as some politicians and publicists as a synonym
for holy war. In its broader sense, it means striving to strengthen the faith of an indi-
vidual and society, and promote Islam. Typically, the four basic meanings of jiha¯d are
defined as jiha¯d by the heart (al-jiha¯d bi-l-qalb, striving for self-improvement, striving
to be a better person and a better Muslim); jiha¯d by the hand (jiha¯d bil yad, i. e., char-
ity work), jiha¯d by the tongue (jiha¯d bil lisa¯n, i. e. spreading the word of Islam and
identifying societal wrongs), and jiha¯d by the sword (jiha¯d bis sayf, i. e., armed war to
defend Islam or its interests). There is a vast amount of nonfiction literature, mostly
focused on its armed variations, such as M. BONNER, Jihad in Islamic History. Doc-
trines and Practice, Princeton – Oxford 2006; D. COOK, Understanding Jihad, Berkeley
– Los Angeles – London 2005; R. FIRESTONE, Jihad. The Origin of Holy War in Islam,
New York – Oxford 1999. An anthropological study by G. MARRANCI, Jihad Beyond
Islam, Oxford – New York 2006, offers a fresh and novel treatment of the topic.
52 I. HRBEK – K. PETRÁCˇEK,Muhammad, Praha 1967, pp. 110–111.
53 Y. FRIEDMANN, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam. Interfaith Relations in the Muslim
Tradition, New York 2003, pp. 84–85.
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non-Muslims’ legal status was, with some exceptions, respected. It is
safe to say their legal standing surpassed that of religious minorities
in Medieval and Early Modern Europe.54
Today, however, in a world that aspires to the Enlightenment ideal
of equality of people of all faiths, the relative open-mindedness of clas-
sical Islam seems troubling, especially to a Western mindset. While
most traditionalist Muslim scholars treat the relationship of Islam to
non-Muslims apologetically, modernist thinkers have scaled new in-
terpretations of this facet of the Qur’a¯nic text, redefining some of the
classic terms of Islamic law. Outstanding among these modernists is
Egyptian Mahmu¯d Shaltu¯t (1893–1963), President of al-Azhar Univer-
sity from 1958 to 1963, and a prominent Islamic thinker of the 20th
century.55
Shaltu¯t rejected religious coercion as indefensible not merely on
spiritual grounds, but on rational ones as well. No one can truly re-
spect, let alone have faith in something delivered to him by force. Is-
lam, founded on purity and simplicity, has no reason to convert un-
believers through violence. Many places in the Qur’a¯n (Qur’a¯n, 2:256,
5:48, 6:35, 6: 125, 10:99, 11:28, 19:43–48, 24:54, 81:27–28 et al.) declare
plainly that God does not want people to accept the faith under threat,
but through learning and contemplation of its revelations.56
Of course, Shaltu¯t had to grapple with a number of Qur’a¯nic verses
that call to battle against non-Muslims. Shaltu¯t does not admit to
any inner inconsistencies within the Qur’a¯nic text, categorically re-
pudiating the practice of the traditional exegetes who attempted to
resolve alleged discrepancies by ascertaining that the later revealed
verses on a certain topic were a “rewritten” version (naskh) of earlier
verses (mansu¯kh). Treating Qur’a¯n as an organic entity, Shaltu¯t prefers
to arrange all verses by a concrete topic and evaluate the connection
between them. This method is especially critical for his interpretation
of jiha¯d. He postulates that armed jiha¯d needs to be understood solely
54 B. LEWIS, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East, New York 1998, pp. 127–128.
55 For more detailed information on Shaltu¯t’s life and work, see M. cIMA¯RA, Ash-
Shaykh Shaltu¯t. Ima¯m fı¯ al-Ijtiha¯d wa at-Tajdı¯d, al-Qa¯hira 2011, pp. 43–59; K. ZEBIRI,
Mahmu¯d Shaltu¯t and Islamic Modernism, Oxford 1993, pp. 1–38.
56 M. SHALTU¯T, The Koran and Fighting, in: R. PETERS (ed.), Jihad in Classical and
Modern Islam, Princeton 2005, pp. 62–70.
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as a defensive war.57 In the times of Prophet Muhammad, the Muslim
community turned to combat only after years of harsh oppression by
the pagan Quraysh. It was then that God revealed the first “militant”
verses (22:39–41), sanctioning active war on the part of those expelled
from their homes and suffering religious persecution. Shaltu¯t argued
that this verse pertained to Muslims as well as others, denouncing
not only the destruction of mosques, but hermitages (sawa¯mic), syna-
gogues (biyac), and houses of worship (salawa¯t) in general. His inter-
pretation of verses 2: 190–194, 4:75, 4:84, 4: 90–91, 8:39, 9:12–13, and
9:36 demonstrates that Muslims are forbidden to initiate hostility and
aggression. Muslims must lay down arms as soon as fighting and en-
emy aggression stop. Then, religious freedomwill flourish and no one
will be victimized or tortured on the grounds of faith.58
All the above statements manifest that Islam is a religion that wel-
comes peaceful and friendly relations with the outside world, foster-
ing collaboration with non-Muslim countries for as long as peace en-
dures and agreements with these countries do not challenge Islam’s
basic principles. Shaltu¯t considered the Qur’a¯nic verses 60:8–9 to be
the fundamental Islamic credo on international relations. When forced
into war, Muslims may not bring on devastation, commit genocide,
and slay women, children, the elderly and the infirm – in other words,
civilians not engaged in aggressions against Muslims. In addition,
subjecting prisoners to mistreatment such as food deprivation (76:8)
is forbidden. Ending a war does not require the enemy to accept Is-
lam. What is required is the cessation of hostilities and signing of a
peace treaty protecting the rights of those who are oppressed.59 The
Qur’a¯n encourages Muslims to embrace the enemy’s request for peace
or truce, if it is sincere and credible (Qur’a¯n, 8:61–62). Muslims must
abide by a fair accord (Qur’a¯n, 16:91–94).60
57 Analytically mature reform interpretations of armed jiha¯d as a purely defensive re-
action to religious oppression have appeared before Shaltu¯t. One example is Indian
modernist scholar, Chira¯gh Alı¯ (1844–1895), see Ch.M. ALI,ACritical Exposition of the
Popular Jiha¯d, Showing that all the Wars of Mohammad were Defensive, and that Aggressive
War, or Compulsory Conversion, is not Allowed in the Koran, Calcutta 1885.
58 SHALTU¯T, pp. 72–76.
59 M. SHALTOUT, Islamic Beliefs and Code of Law, in: K.W. MORGAN (ed.), Islam, the
Straight Path. Islam Interpreted by Muslims, Delhi 1987, pp. 128–129.
60 SHALTU¯T, The Koran and Fighting, pp. 92–93.
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In the same spirit, Shaltu¯t regarded the relationship of Muslims to
non-Muslims in an Islamic state. In his view, Islam is neither hos-
tile nor hateful toward non-Muslims. Instead, it champions peace-
ful coexistence and cooperation in everyday life, striving toward the
common good and mutual tolerance (Qur’a¯n, 42:15, 109:1–6). Non-
Muslims living in an Islamic state must be assured freedom of belief
and the liberty to practice sacred rituals and ceremonies in their own
shrines. Non-Muslims are entitled to the same rights and have the re-
sponsibilities as Muslims. Belonging to a particular religion does not
create social superiority. According to Shaltu¯t, the only thing Islam
requires from non-Muslims is to refrain from attacks on Muslims and
the Islamic way of life. Then they are free to preach and practice their
religion.61
It is clear that Shaltu¯t’s attitude towards non-Muslims in an Islamic
state resembles the modern model of equality of all citizens before
the law, and does not evoke the traditional discriminatory concept of
dhimma. Even though this term appears in his texts, he explains it in a
different way. In essence, Shaltu¯t dismantles the traditional Islamic di-
vision of non-Muslims into the “people of the Book” (ahl al-kita¯b) and
polytheists (mushriku¯n). The only person seen as an infidel (ka¯fir) is one
that has rejected the divine message willfully, out of hubris or selfish-
ness. Conversely, the label of an unbeliever cannot be attached to a
person ignorant of the message of Islam, one who was taught about
Islam through hate, one not able to fully grasp it, or one who was ca-
pable of grasping it but died before being wholly persuaded. Such
a person will not suffer eternal punishment in the afterlife, even if he
had practiced no religion, because the Qur’a¯n only mentions infidelity
(kufr) in context with obstinacy and arrogance.62
Apart from some general remarks on equal rights and responsibili-
ties, Shaltu¯t refrained from elaborating on the particulars of the status
of non-Muslims in Islamic society. In his idealistic rendering, the Is-
lamic state was a paternalistic entity, protective of Muslims as well as
all others. Based on the example of Prophet Muhammad, who in one
61 SHALTOUT, Islamic Beliefs and Code of Law, pp. 126–128. Of course, the given text
here does not explain Shaltu¯t’s attitude to the proselytizing activities by members
of other religions among Muslims, which were extremely problematic from Islam’s
point of view.
62 Ibidem, p. 92.
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dispute between a Muslim and a Jew ruled in favor of the Jew, Shaltu¯t
stated that before the righteous law of God, all people, “black and white,
strong and weak, Muslim and non-Muslim, rulers and subjects” are equal.
Occasionally, Shaltu¯t’s claims become ambiguous. One example is his
lauding the traditional discriminatory system of paying the jizya by
non-Muslims as a testament to their loyalty to the state and the will
to shoulder its financial burdens. Nowhere, however, does he suggest
reintroducing this system in modern day Egypt.63
Shaltu¯t also offers a reformist interpretation of certain traditional
sharı¯ca concepts. One such instance is the legal analysis of a model
case of a non-Muslim, murdered by a Muslim. Here, Shaltu¯t declares
the sanctity of blood (hurmat ad-dam) of all humans, without exception,
and the possibility of inflicting a punishment on the perpetrator (qisa¯s).
Among the traditional legal schools (madhhab, pl. madha¯hib),64 only
the Hanafı¯ya and Ma¯likı¯ya allowed for this possibility.65 Disagreeing
with the interpretation of the term “brother” in the Qur’a¯nic verse
2: 178 on qisa¯s as applying to Muslims only, Shaltu¯t regards it in its
broader sense as a fellow human being.66
As an orthodox ca¯lim, strictly adhering to the text of the Qur’a¯n,
Mahmu¯d Shaltu¯t would neither distort its primarymeaning nor thrust
aside certain parts in favor of others. It is very nearly impossible to ac-
cuse him of lacking authenticity or erudition in the field of Qur’a¯nic
exegesis. Unlike many a liberal Egyptian Muslim intellectual deliver-
ing reform ideas to a limited audience, Shaltu¯t was a household name
(in and outside of Egypt), and widely respected at that. Perhaps this
latter factor adds so much depth and significance to his interpretation
of Islamic attitudes towards violence and non-Muslims. In the light
of the present day upheavals, his vision of Islam as a religion of toler-
ance, peace, and cooperation among peoples andmembers of different
creeds represents a noteworthy contribution to interfaith discourse.
63 ZEBIRI, pp. 71–72.
64 For basic information on individual legal doctrines, see classical work J. SCHACHT,
An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford 1982, pp. 57–68.
65 For classical legal discourse about qisa¯s in the case of murder of a non-Muslim by a
Muslim, see FRIEDMANN, pp. 39–53.
66 ZEBIRI, p. 90.
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Conclusion
In spite of earlier opinions of some Orientalists, the heterogenic ide-
ological branch of modern Islam, referred to simply as Islamic mod-
ernism is indeed a “natural” and within Islam fully authentic search
for satisfactory solution of various social issues faced by Muslim so-
ciety in modern times. Islamic modernism is striving to justify Islam
as a living religion under ever changing conditions, and not to dis-
place it outside public sphere. In spite of varying degrees of influence
by modern Western ideas based on European Enlightenment Islamic
modernists formulate their reformist attitudes within categories of Is-
lam referring to Qur’a¯n as the essential source for reinterpretation of
certain “outdated” norms of classical Islamic jurisprudence or tradi-
tions and customs of Muslim societies.
This paper analyses the way three renowned Egyptian thinkers ap-
proach three essential issues faced by Muslims in modern times – the
status of women in society, the relation of Islam and politics and the
relation of Muslims and the non-Muslim world. The opinions of these
three thinkers differ in many ways. They have a different degree of
religious education, of personal experience with Western society and
their reputation and the level of acceptance of their ideas by both
Egyptian intellectuals and general public varied as well. Islamic mod-
ernism is not a homogeneous group and Islamic modernism has never
been a monolith. Its basic common characteristic feature has always
been the return to Qur’a¯n as a single primary valid source of Islamic
religion that can be reinterpreted to arrive at harmony between Islam
and the requirements of modern times. Such reinterpretation requires
rejection of certain standard and general postulates or methods of tra-
ditional Islam. Qa¯sim Amı¯n was able to interpret Islam as a system
favouring emancipation of women by factually rejecting the classical
thesis on the interconnection of religion and civilization within Islam.
cAlı¯ cAbd ar-Ra¯ziq rejected the political dimension of Islam and so
provided for, on theoretical level, political secularization of Muslim
societies without rejecting the validity of Islam and the significant role
it plays in public life. Mahmu¯d Shaltu¯t rejected the traditional and by
the majority of Muslim scholars accepted method of preference of the
later revealed verses over the earlier revealed verses and replaced it
with a method of accumulation and ordering of all verses on a given
topic and analysing their mutual relations. Thanks to this method he
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was able to interpret Islam as a highly tolerant religion that allows
violent acts only in extreme cases of self-defence. Even though rein-
terpretation attempts of these thinkers involved different issues they
all show that Islam can be reformed (despite frequent claims of the
rigidity of Islam because of the specific status of Qur’a¯n as directly re-
vealed God’s word). Islamic modernism can be considered as one of
the fully fledged reform branches of Islam that have been resurfacing
in the course of history of this religion in various contexts, in various
forms and that have brought various answers to many questions with
varying effect and role they played in practical life ofMuslim societies.
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